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IN 'rHE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RIUHMUND. 
Record No& 2233 
LULA. TALLEY McKINSEY, Petitioner, 
versits 
VERNON S. CULLINGSWORTH, INDIVIDUALLY, A.ND 
A.S ADMIN'LSTRA.TOR, C. T. A.., OF THE ESTA.TE 
OF ADDIE J. SMITH, DEIOEA.SED, Respondent. , 
PE·TITION FOR AN A.PPEA.L. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme. 
Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Lula Talley McKinsey, respectfully rep-
resents that she is aggTieved by the Final Decree of the Chan-
cery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, entered on the 
26th day of July, 1939, in a certain suit in chancery lately 
pending in the said court, wherein your petitioner was com-
plainant and the said Vernon S. Oullingsworth, individually, 
and as administrator, c. t. a., of the estate of Addie J. Smith, 
d~ceased, was respondent, in which said ~pacities the parties 
will be referred to throughout this Petition. 
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THE CASE IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The complainant filed her original Bill of Complaint 
2'"' against *the respondent at the First February Rules, 
1938, praying that the respondent should be decreed a 
trustee for the benefit of the complainant of part of the in-
come derived from the estate of the complainant's lately de-
ceased aunt, Addie J. Smith. To this Bill of Complaint, the 
respondent, on the 12th day of April, 1938, demurred, stating 
as the grounds of his demurrer that the Bill was without 
_ equity, that the plain language of the will of Addie J . .Smith 
showed that the testatrix had left all of her estate in fee 
simple to the respondent and that she did not intend to create 
a trust in favor of the complainant. Thereafter, on the 6th 
day of January, 1939, the complainant filed her Amended 
Bill of Complaint, the Court not having yet ruled upon the 
Demurrer, to which, on the 26th day of July, 1939, the re-
spondent, without having~ filed any answer to either the origi-
nal or amended Bills of Complaint, again demurred, assign-
ing as his additional grounds of demurrer, first, that the 
matters and things alleged by the complainant had been in-
quired into and determi~ed against the complainant by the 
probate order of the Court dated the 6th day of October, 
1932, and, second, that the additional matter alleged in the 
Amended Bill of Complaint was immaterial, irrelevant and . 
inadmissible. By ifa:; Decree dated the 26th day of July, 1939, 
the Court sustained the Demurrers of the respondent, to 
which action of the Court the complainant excepted. This 
action of the Court is now assigned as error. 
~THE QUESTION ON APPEAL. 
The question presented by this cause is whether the will 
of Addie J. Smith conferred upon the respondent an absolute 
title to all of the property of which the testatrix died seized 
and possessed or whether it conferred upon the respondent 
a bare legal title thereto subject to a charge for the support 
and maintenance of the complainant. 
THE PETITIONER'S. ALLEGATIONS 0~ F A!CT. 
This cause having :been decided upon demurrer, the alle-
gations of the complainant, of course, are taken as true. It 
appears that the complainant. was the favorite niece of Addie 
J. Smith, the testatrix, and that she is the "Lula" mentioned 
in the testatrix 's will. The complainant and the respondent 
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are sister and brother. All of the members of their family, 
including the respondent, understood, as had been repeatedly 
stated by the testatrix, that the complainant was to receive 
all of the testatrix' property upon the latter's death. 
On Friday, August 19, 1932, the testatrix wrote a letter 
to the complainant by which the strong ties of affection exist-
ing between the testatrix and the complainant, the extreme 
poverty of the complainant and. the antipathy which the tes-
tatrix felt for the respondent all clearly appear. 
4~ *On the 2nd day of September, 1932, Addie J. Smith 
died, and on the 6th day' of October, 1932, a. holographic 
writing bearing date, the 29th day of August, 1932, was ad-
mitted to probate in the chancery Court of the City of R.ich-
mond as and for her last will and testament, the terms of 
which are to be found upon page 2 of the Transcript. 
After the probate of the will, the respondent often promised 
the complainant to comply with the terms of the will and make 
some provision for her. At the time of the filing by the com-
plainant of her Bill of Complaint, however, the respondent 
ha.d refused to recognize the trust imposed upon him by the 
will of the said Addie J. Smith in favor of the complainant 
and had converted the whole of the testatrix 's estate, the 
amount of which is known only to the respondent, to his own 
use and benefit. 
ARGUMENT. 
The holographic will here under consideration is most in-
artificially phrased. The clause conferring some sort of an 
estate upon the first taker, namely the respondent, gives no 
indication of the interest soug·ht to he conferred. It is in 
these words : '' * * * I want you to have my home and every 
thin~ * • *.'' Immediately following this clause the context 
of the will is as follows: '' * • * and you and yoit take care of 
Lula the best you can * * •. '' Now here else is there any lan-
guag·e in the will itself either explanatory or indicative of 
the nature of the estate intended to be given the respondent. 
The words comprising t11e phrase '' you take care of Lula'· 
5s are •employed in a sequence peculiar to that of a com-
mand; and the verb "take ca.re" is in the imperative 
mood. 
To disre~arcl the last-quoted phrase as merely suggestive 
or recommendatory would be to declare that the testatrix 
had employed ·such lang"uage in an unnatural and ungram-
ma.tical sense, yet upon this untenable theory were the de-
murrers of the respondent predicated. The complainant re-
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lies upon an interpretation of the provision made for her 
according to. th~ commonly accepted meaning of the words 
used. The case is, the ref ore, one of contested interpretation, 
if, indeed, the respondent should be permitted to argue against 
the natural meaning of the testatrix's language. In such event, 
although its rig·htful existence is denied ·by the complainant, 
the complainant. contends that the apparently imperative con-
text o_f the provision made for her is rendered clear and cer .. 
tain ey a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the 
~testatrix at the time of the execution of the will by her. To 
this the respondent answers, according to the grounds set 
forth in his demurrers and by way of arguing from his con-
clusion, that proof of suc11 circumstances would ibe inadmis-
sible inasmuch as the will had already vested a fee simple in-
terest in the respondent. It is too clear for argument that 
_ such a contention refuses to recognize the elementary propo-
sition to the effect that in all cases similar to the one at bar 
the possibly absolute estate given the first taker is cut down 
or not according to the intent of the •testator as found 
6* in the context of the whole will or a8 gathered from the 
context of the will interpreted in the light of the circum-
stances surrounding the testator at the time of his execution 
of the will, if the will standing alone be ambiguous. 
Before attempting to submit her earnest conclusions as to 
the proper determiuation of this ca.use, the complainant begs 
leave to discuss separately the several principles of law which 
seem applicable. It will be urged that the doctrine of preca.-
tory trusts should be applied to this cause; i. e., words ad-
dressed by the testatrix to the first taker under the will which 
should or should not be construed as impei:ative according to 
an interpretation of the whole will in t.he light of extrinsic 
evidence, tl1e certain designatiou of the object of the trust, 
and the certainty of the subject-matter affected by the trust. 
(1) Adm.issib·ility atnd Releva1wp of Fads Alleged. · 
In view of the circumstance that it will be desired to dis-
cuss the several other principles of law involved with refer-
ence to tl1e complainant's allegations of fact, it is proposed 
to point out ·fiirst, the admissibility and relevance of those 
allegations. That, if entitled to consider them under the 
rules of evidence, tl1e circumstances of the destitute situa-
tion of the complainant, the strong affection between her 
and the testatrix, the desire on the part of the latter to pro-
vide for the former, and the unfriendly feeling of t11e tes-
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tatrix for the r,~spondent, would be of invaluable aid to 
7"" tp.e •court in construing 'the will and would furnish evi-
dence highly relevant and of unquestionable probative 
force is clear. The law, it is respectfully submitted, is equally 
clear that such evidence is admissible. 
· In Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. I, sec. 48, p. 226, 
the rule is stated in these words: 
. '' The use of any particular precatory word will not be of 
much influence in determining the question of intent. Aid in 
s·olving the problem must be sought in consideration of other 
portions of the instrument and the facts surrounding the 
supposed settlor, trustee, and cestui at the time of the execu-
tion of the instrument.'' 
In Coffnian's Adm.'r. v. Coffma.n, 131 Va. 456, 462, 463, this 
Honorable Court quoted with approval from an article by 
Professor 1Charles A. Graves, published in Vol. VI of the 
Bar Association Reports, page 183., et seq., and in 14 Va. Law 
Reg., pag·e 913, et seq. It was there said, after illustrating· that 
the author had properly divided extrinsic evidence into two 
classes, calling the first ''facts and circumstances'' and the 
second '' declaration of intention'': 
'' Having made this classification, Professor Graves pro-
ceeds to show that evidence of the first kind, 'the facts and· 
circumstances,' is always admissible in a case of disputed 
interpretation, saying: 'For the object of interpretation is 
to ascertain the meaning of the words as used by the testa-
tor; what the w01·ds represented in his mind; what he undet-
stoog to be· signified by them: and for this purpose it is in-
dispensable that the expositor should know the situation of 
the testator; the state of his family and property; his rela-
tions to p~rsons and things; his opinions and beliefs ; his 
hopes and fears; his habits of thought and .of language; in a 
word, that the interpreter should identify himself with the 
s• testator as to knowledge, feeling, and '1 speech, and thus, 
scanning- the words of the will from the testator's point 
of view, decide as t.o their meaning· as used by him'." 
.Ag·ain in the case of l"Va.llace v. lf1alla.cc, 168 Va. 216, 224, 
the rule is clearly stated. Holt, J ., in delivering the opinion 
of. thA Court, said: 
'' 'In the construct.ion of ambiguous expressions the situa-
tion of the parties may very pfoperly 1be taken into view. 
The ties which connect the testator with his legatees, the 
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affection subsisting between them, the motives which may 
reasonably be supposed to operate with him arid to influence 
him in the disposition of his property, are all entitled to 
consideration in expounding doubtful words, and in ascer...: 
taining the meaning in which the testator used them.' Smith 
v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 74, 75, 8 L. Ed. 322; Colton v. 'Colton, 127 
U. S. 300, 8 S. Ct. 1164, 32 L. Ed. 138; Article by Prof. Graves, 
14th Law Reg. 913. 
'' 'And in order the better to comprehend the scheme which 
the testator had in his mind for the disposition of his estate, 
the judicial expositor is permitted to place himself, figura-
tively speaking, in the very shoes of the person whose will 
he is called on to c.onstrue, • * *.' Hatcher v. Hatcher, 80 Va. 
169, 171." . 
(2) The Doctrine of Precatory TruRts in Virginia. 
Although in some jurisdictions the early English tendency 
to strongly favor the declaration of precatory trusts has been 
modified to some extent, this is not true in Virginia. Here 
this valuable equitable doctrine in aid of a testator's inten-
tion seems to be applied liberally. In the case of Farmers 
9* Bank v. Kinser, *169 Va. 69, 75, the facts differed from -
those in the casP. at bar in that there the limitation to the 
first taker expressly conferred a fee simple interest, the lan-
guage ,being: '' * * * to have and to hold in fee simple • * •.'' 
.But in the opinion of the Court, Browning, J., pointed out 
that it was recog·nized in 1 Harrison's Wills and Administra-
.tion, p. 565, sec. 280, that "The decisions in Virginia and 
West Virginia aJJpellate courts do not sl10w the same degree 
·of relaxation that appears in the decisions of other States." 
The language employed by Keith, P., in the opinion in the 
.case of Seefried v. Clarke, 113 Va. 365, 370, 372, clearly in-
dicates that preGatory trusts a.re favored in Virginia. He 
said: 
"In tl1e construction of wills the object is to ascertain the 
meaning of the testator. A will is but the legal declaration 
of a person's mind, his intent, liis wish, his will, as to the 
disposition of his property after his death. That will may 
be expressed in · terms of command, of recommendation, of 
entreaty, of request; and if. from the language used, the 
Court can ascertain the will of the testator-if the sugges-
tion. or tlle recommendation, or the wish, be certain, and if 
the beneficiaries of the wish he also certain-the Court will 
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Further on, after quoting from the text of Bispham 's Prin-
ciples of Equity to the effect that the primary inquiry is as 
to the testator's intention, he continues: 
, . "0011-tinuing, the same author says: 'Precatory expres-
s~ons oug·ht, prima faaie, to be considered as imperative, and 
to exclude discretion; the :wish of a testator, no matter how 
expressed, if expressed clearly, should be regarded 
10* ~ as a command. This is the opinion of Lord Redesdale 
.·. in Oa_rry v. Carry, 2 .Soho. & Lef. 1$9, and although the 
dicta in some subsequent ~ases would seem to be in favor of 
giving a less decided effect to words of recommendation or 
. request, yet it is conceived that the above statement of tho 
rule is justified by the best considered decisions both in ;Eng-
~and and in this country. It is seldom, indeed, that expres-
sions of this nature. are. found standing alone,. and not 
strengthened, or qualified, or controlled by the context; but 
when they do stand alone they ought to be considered a.s i~-
posing an oblig·ation, and not merely as constituting a re-
quest, which the person to whom it is addressed is at liberty 
to disregard. The reason is obvious. A will, in its very na~ 
ture, is the disposition which the testator desires to have 
made of his estate after his death. All expressions in it in-
dicative of his wisJ1 or will are commands.' 3 Porn. Eq. Jur. 
(3d Ed.), 1905. '' 
(3) Interpretation of the P1·ecatory Words in the Light of 
the Facts. 
The precatory words here relied upon by the complainant 
were construed by Lord Chancellor Brougham in the case of 
Foley v. Perry, 2 Mylne & Keene, 138. In that case it appeared 
tl1at the testator had devised and bequeathed all of his es-
tate, both real and personal, to his wife for life, wishing and 
requesting tlrnt. his great-nephew be educated and "taken 
ca:r;e of'', with several remainders over. The Lord !Chancellor 
pointed out that the expression ''taken care of" ~as a very 
strong- expression indicating-the intention to impose' a trust 
npon tl1e life estate of the.wife, and so declared. 
In tl1e case of Beyer v. Lefevre, 186 U. S., 114. 121, the tes-
. tamentary words to be construed were: "* * • knowing 
].1'8 that thew will *provide a home and home comforts for 
* • '"''' the husband of the testatrix. It was held that 
such lammag-e created a trust for the maintenance and sup-
port of the husband during his lifetime. 
Again in the case of Sh-ired v. Nesbit, 90 S. C. 23, 72 S. E. 
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546, the words of the testator, ' ' ~ * • shall take care of my 
beloved wife " * * '' were held to have created a trust for the 
support of the wife and a decree was entered for a specified 
amount based upon the annual value of the estate .. 
Many other authorities are to be found wherein· language 
of a similar import has been construed. Their aid in the 
present inquiry is rendered very doubtful, however, by reason 
of the great dissimilarity between the extrinsic evidence of 
facts and circumstances admitted in them and· the facts as 
alleged by the complainant in this cause. Here the doctrine 
enunciated in Seefried v. Clarke, supra, to the effect that 
precatory words ought, pri·ma facie, to be construed as im-
pera.tive, the employment by the testatrix of the syntax and 
mood of a command, and facts highly indicative of an inten-
tion and desire on the part of the testatrix to make a binding 
provision in favor of the complainant, all consistently point 
to the correctness of the complainant's contention. 
( 4) The C e·rtainty u f the B en.ofociary_. 
The identity of the complainant as the ''Lula'' named in 
the will is, of course, admitted by the demurrers and needs 
no further discussion. 
12* • ( 5) The Qitanfo,1n of the Provision. 
The third requirement of a valid precatory trust is that its 
subject-matter be certain. The language of the will here un-
der consideration is '' e • "" and you take care of Lula the 
best you can''. While it may be true that if the subject-mat-
ter of a supposed trust is so uncertain as to be incapable of 
enforcement by a court of equity, the trust will fail, here there 
is no such difficulty. In the case of See.fried v. Clarke, supra, 
a:t pag·es 374, 375, Keith, P., in referring with approval to 
the cai.;e of Colton v. r.olt01i, 127 U. S. 300, 32 L. Ed. 138, said: 
'' The court then considers the objection that the trust 
sought to be established by the will in that ca.se was incapable 
of being executed by reason of uncertainty · as to the form 
and extent of the provision intended, and because it involved 
the exerdse of discretionary power on the part of the trus-
tee~ which a court of equity has no rig·ht.ful authority to con-
trol; and quotes with approval from Lewin on Trusts ( 4th 
Eng-. Ed.), section·s 2, 402, 403, where it is said that 'it. is 
quite true that where the manner of executing a trust is left 
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there is no 1nala, fides, the court will not ordinarily control 
their discretion as to t]1e way in which they exercise tpe 
power; so that if a fund be applicable to the maintenance of 
children at the discretion of trustees, the court will not take 
upon itself, in the first instance, to regulate the maintenance, 
but will leave it to the trustees. But the Court will iuterf ere 
wherever the exercise of the discretion by the trustees is in-
fected with fraud or misbehavior, or they decline to under-
take the duty of exercising· the discretion, or generally where 
the discretion is mischievously and erroneously exercised, 
as if a trustee be authorized to lay out money upon govern-
ment, o;r real, or personal security, and the trust fund is out-
standing upon any hazardous security.' 
13* *"In Costabadie v. Costabadie, 6 Hare, 410, Vice-
Chancellor "'Wigram, on this subject, said: 'If the gift 
be subject to the discretion of another person, so long as 
that person exercises a sound and honest discretion, I am 
not aware of any principle or any authority upon which the 
court should deprive the party of that discretionary powe1~. 
~ere a proper and honest discretion is exercised, the lega-
tee takes all that the testator gave or intended that he should 
have-that is, so much as, in the honest and reasonable exer-
cise of that discretion, be is entitled to. That is the measure 
of the legacy.' 
" 'But it is always for the court eventually to say, when 
called upon, whether the discretion has been either exercised 
at all, or exercised honestly and in good faith.' Colton v. 
Colton, su,pra. _ 
''Summing up the whole discussion on the point, the Su-
preme Court in Col.ton v. Colton, supra, concluded: 'If the 
trustee refuses altogether to exercise the discretion with 
which he is invested, the trust must not on that account be 
defeated, unless by its terms it is made dependent upon the 
will of the trustee himself'." 
In the case of R-inker'.c; Adm 'r. v. Simpson, 159 Va. 612, 
621, 622, the principle that a court of equity will even inter. 
f ere to require the proper exercise' of a very :broad discr~-
tion vested in trustees under proper circumstances was re-
affirmed. Epps, J., there said: 
""" to (;c but where trustees are acting in bad faith in the 
exercise of their discretion, or they are plainly abusing their 
discretion, or exercising it in such an arbitrary manner, as, 
in effect, to make it a means of destroying the trust which 
it was intended to aid and maintain, a court of chancery wiU 
10, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
intervene and compel the. trustees to administer the trust in 
a proper manner and at a proper time.'' 
In the. case of Colton, v. Colton, supra, pages 316, 317, 
14 e where the *testator's will left all of his property to his 
wife, adding the following language: '' and request her 
to make such gift and provision for them as in her judgment 
will be best'', the Court said : 
"Is there anything in the languag·e of the clause itself, in 
its context, or in the circumstances and situation of the tes-
tator when he framed it, to indicate an intention on his part 
to confer upon his widow the authority to accept his prop-
erty, and at the same time to refuse to use- it according to 
his request? Undoubtedly he gives to her some discretion 
on the subject; the gift and provision which he requests fo1· 
his mother and sister is to be such as in her judgment will be 
best. It is to such as will be best for them, having· regard to 
all the circumstances, :both of their necessities and the amount 
anq sufficiency of the estate ; and this proportion, which is 
to constitute wha.t shall be best,, is to be determined by the 
widow in the exercise of her judgment. It is her judgment 
that is to he called into ~xercise, and this excludes caprice, 
whim. and every merely arbitrary award; but whatever the 
judgment may be, and whatever discretion is involved in its 
exercise, it operates only upon the nature, form, character, 
and amount of the gift and provision intended for them.'' . 
• 
"That discretion does not involve the right to choose 
whether a provision shall be made or not; nor is there any-
thing personal or a.rbitrary implied in it. It is to be the exer-
cise of judgment directed to the care and protection of the 
beneficiaries by making such a provision as will best secure 
that end. There is nothing in this left so vague and indefinite 
that it cannot, by the usual processes of tl1e law, be reduced 
to certainty. Courts of common law constantly determine 
the reasonable value of property sold, where there is no agree-
mcmt as to price, and the judge and jury are frequently called 
upon to adjudge what are necessaries for an infant or rea-
·sonable maintenance for a deserted wife. The princi-
15• ples of equity and the $machinery of its courts are 
still better adapted to such inquiries. In the exercise 
·or their discretion over trusti:; and trustees, it is a funda-
mental maxim. that no trust shall fail for want of a. trustee, 
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~nd where the trustee appointed neglects, refuses, or be· 
comes incapable of executing the trust, the court itself in 
many cases will act as trustee. In 1lhorp v. Owen, 2 Hare, 
607_, 610, Wigram, V. 0., said: 'vVhatever difficulties mig·ht 
originally have been supposed to exist in the way of a court 
9f equity enforcing a trust, the extent of which was unascer-
tained, the cases appear clearly to decide that a court of 
equity can measure the extent of interest which an adult, as 
well as an infant, takes under a trust for his support, main-
tenance and advancement, provision, or other like indefinite 
expression, applicable to a fund larger confessedly than the 
party entitled to the support, maintenance, or advancement 
can claim, and some interest in which is given to another 
person.' -.And in Foley v. Parry, 2 Myl. & K. 138, where the 
words of ~ will were 'and it is my particular wish and re-
quest that my dea_r wife. and A. will superintend and take 
care of the education of D. so as to fit him for any respectable 
profession or employment,' it was held that a charge was 
created on the interest taken by the testator's widow which 
could be made effectual by a court of equity,''. 
The rule is also very briefly stated in Page on Wills, 2nd 
ed., sec. 1043, p. 1715. There the author, after stating· that 
the intention of the testator to create a· precatory trust need 
not be ex,pressed in any particular language, says: 
"Where such a direction in the will is given, and the dev-
isee does not make any provision for the person indicated, 
equity will make suitable prnvision out of the estate of the 
testator.'' 
See also Bare's Ex'rs. v. Montgomery, 143 Va. 303. 
16• *It thus clearly appears that the testatrix in the in-
stant case in contemplation of a court of equity com-
manded the respondent to provide for the complainant in 
such manner as would be best for her, having regard to all 
of the circumstances, both of her necessities a.nd the sufficiency 
of the estate left by the testatrix, and that, the trustee having 
refused to act altogetlier, the Court will see what provision 
would he reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION. 
•For the reasons hereinbef ore set forth, the complainant, 
now your petitioner, submits tha.t the Chancery Court of the 
12 Supr~me 'Court of Appeals of Virginia~ 
City of Richmond erred to her prejudice in entering its de-
cree of July 26, 1939, and prays that this Honorable Court 
may grant an appeal from the said decree, review and re-
verse the same and that it will remand this cause to the above-
named trial court with directions to require the respondent 
to file his answer, to admit evid~nce and to proceed to a de-
termination of. the cause in conformity with the principles 
of law herein discussed. 
Counsel for the petitioner has given a copy of this Petition 
to R. Hugh Rudd, Esq., counsel for the tespondent1 this 7th 
day of September, 1939. 
Counsel for the petitioner desires to rely lii)On this Petition 
as his opening brief, will file the same in the Clerk's 
17~ Office of *the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals at 
Richmond, Virginia, and requests an oral hearing of 
the application for ·an appeal. 
LULA TALLEY McKINSEY, 
By Counsel. 
ROBERT LEWIS .YOUNG, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
The undersigned, an attorney duly qualified to practice in 
the Supreme !Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that 
in my opinion there is ma.nif est error in the record of the 
proceedings in the foregoing· cause and that in my opinion 
it is proper that the decree entered therein by the Chancery 
Court of the City of Richmond in the said cause on the 26th 
day of July, 1939, should be reviewed, reversed, and remanded 
by this Honorable Court. 
Giveri under my hand this 7th day of September, 1939 . 
Received Sept. 7, 1939. 
Received Sept. 22, 1939. 
• T. B. BROWDER, 
State Planters Bank Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
c. v. s. 
October 3, 1939. Appeal awarded by the court. Bond 
$250. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD. 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Judge of the Chancery Court of the 
City of Richmond, the 26th day of July, 1939. . 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: on the 19th day 
of January, 1938, came the complainant, by counsel, and 
sued out of the :Clerk's Office of the Chancery Court, sub-
poenas in chancery against the defendants, directed to the 
proper officer and returnable to the first Monday in February, 
1938, which subpoenas and the returns of the officer thereon 
-are in due form. 
And at another day, to-wit: at rules held in the Clerk's 
Office on the 1st Monday in :£4,ebruary, 1938, came the com-
plainant, by counsel, and filed her bill, which bill is in the 
words and figures following·, to-wit: -
BILL. 
L~la Talley McKinsey, Complainant, 
v. 
Vernon ~. cuilingsworth, individually and as Administrator 
c. t. a. of the estate of Addie J. ~mith, d~ceased, R~~pon4~nt. 
IN CHANCERY. 
To the :flonorable ,vmiam A. Moncure, Judge of the said 
Court: 
Your complainant, Lula Talley McKinsey, respectfully 
shows unto Your Honor the following case: 
page 2 r That your complainant, Lula Talley McKinsey, 
was the niece of Addie J. Smith, your complainant's 
father and the said Addie J. Smith being brother and sister; 
that the said Addie .J. Smith departed this life on the 2nd 
day of September,-1932; and that a paper writing purport-
ing to be the ~ast will and testament. of t.he said Addie J. 
·smith was, on the 6th day of October, 1932, admitted to pro-
bate in this Honora·ble Court; and that the said will and the 
order of probate thereof are in the following words and 
figures, as more fully appears from the records of this Honor-
aple Court. : · 
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Ve1:).n<>r im verry sick if anything happen to me you look . 
after me as you did Douglas I dont think I can get well 
V ennor I want you to have my home and every thing and 
you and you take care of Lula the best you can 
Virginiat 
Yount Aunt Addie J. Smith 
Aug. 29th 1932. 
In the Chancery Court of the tCi ty of Richmond, the 6th da.y 
of October, 1932. 
A hologr~ph paper writing, bearing date the 29th day of. 
August, 1932, purporting· to be the last will and testament of 
.Addie J. Smith, deceased, was this day produced to the Court 
and offered for proof. 
It appearing to the Court that the said Addie J. 
page 3 ~ Smith was a resident of the City of Richmond, and 
that she departed this life on the 2nd day of Sep..: 
tember, 1932; and there being 110 subscribing witnesses to 
the said paper writing, George W. C. Robinson, Burnett 
Lewi~ and Annie C. Robinson, three competent witnesses, 
being· fiTst duly sworn, severally deposed that neith~r one 
was interested in, or a beneficiary under said paper writing, 
that they were all acquainted with the said Addie J. Smith, 
during her lifetime, familiar with her handwriting,----
together with the signature thereto, is wholly in the hand..: 
writing of the said Addie J. Smith, deceased, and they fur-
ther deposed tha.t the said Addie J. Smith was of sound mind . 
and memory and capable (?f ma.king a will. , 
Thereupon the said paper writing bearing date the 29th 
day of August, 1932, is established and ordered to be r-e-
corded as and. for .the true last will and testament of the 
said Addie J. Smith, dece~sed. . . 
There being nQ Executor name.d .in said will, on .the motion 
of Vernon S. Cullingsworth, nephew, and . sole beneficiary, 
the Court ·doth appoint him as Administrator, with the will 
annexed, pf the estate of the· said Addie J. Smith,. deceased. 
Thereupon the said Vernon S. 1Cullingsworth,. this i!EiY ap~ 
peared in open Court, made oath .as the law directs,. and, to~ 
gether, with Pearl Edith Cullingsworth, his surety, who first 
----,.-acknowledged a bond as such Administrator in the 
penalty of Two Thousand Dollars,. payable and conditioned 
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And certificate is granted the said Vernon S. Cul-
page 4 } lingsworth for obtaining letters of administration 
on the estate of the said Addie J. Smith, deceased, 
with the will of the said Addie J. Smith annexed, in due 
form. 
Teste: 
CHAS. 0. SA VILLE, Clerk. 
Your complainant further believes and now so alleges that 
the saiq. Addie J. Smith left a considerable estate, composed 
of both real and personal property, and that among other 
things she left a dwelling known as Number 2513 West Main 
Street, Richmond, Virginia, and considerable money in a 
bankJ but that your complainant has been unable .to ascertain 
the exact amount of the estate of the said Addie J. Smith 
by reason of the fact that the said respondent Vernon S. 
Cullingsworth, has never, as administrator, civm testamento 
annexo, filed any inventory or other accounting concerning 
the said estate; and your .complainant through her attorney 
has examined the records of this Honorable Court and the 
records in the office of John M. Minor, !Commissioner of Ac.:. 
counts, and that no such inventory or other accounting could 
be found. -
Your complainant further alleges that she is the person 
named as "Lula" in the will of the said Addie J. Smith, and 
that notwithstanding the provision in the said will directing 
the respondent to take care of your complainant, and the 
trust thereby imposed upon the respondent in favor of. your 
complainant, your complainant has never received any por-
tion of the income or the corpus of the estate of the said 
Addie J. Smith. 
page 5 ~ .Your complainant further alleges that she has 
many times requested tl1e respondent to make some 
provision for her according to tbe terms of the will and that 
the respondent often promised to do so but that the. said 
promises were never complied with; that in the month of 
October, 1935, the respondent promised the complainant to 
meet her at an hour named in order to appear before Your 
Honor and ask for an interpreta.tion of the will and counsel 
with regard to complying with its terms, but that the respond-
ent failed to appear on the day named; and the respondent 
now absolutely refuses to rccog11ize the trust in favor of your 
complainant imposed upon him under the terms of the will 
of the said Addie J. Smith; and that the respondent bas now 
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applied and converted the whole of the estate of the said 
Addie J .. Smith to his own use and benefit. 
Wherefore, your complainant being· without remedy save 
in a court of equity; wherein matters of this kind are alone 
and properly cognizable, your complainant p1·ays that the 
said Vernon S. Cullingsworth, individually and as Adminis-
trator c. t. a. of the estate of ,Addie J. Smith, deceased, may 
be made party respondent to this bill, and be required to 
make full and sufficient answer to the same under oath, and 
that proper process issue; that the said respondent in his 
answer be required to set forth a true and perfect account 
of all the property which ·canie into his hands, both real and 
personal, as administrator ciem testamento annexo, under the 
will of the said Addie J. Smith; together with an 
page 6 ~ account of the application thereof; and that this 
Honorable Court may construe the will of the said 
Addie J. Smith and decree the interest of your complainant 
in the estate of the said Addie J'. Smith, if the same shall be 
shown to still be in existence, and, if not, that this Honorable 
Court may decree the amount your complainant should have 
received from the distribution of the said estate, and the 
respondent may ibe decreed to pay the same to your com-
plainant; and that the respondent may be removed from be-
ing trustee under .the said will and that · some other person 
or persons may be appointed trustee or trustees under the 
said will in his place and stead, and that in the meantime 
some proper person may be appointed to receive and collect 
the said trust estate and effects; and that your complainant 
may have all such other, further- and general relief in the 
premises as equity may require and to Your Honor shall seem 
meet. · 
LULA TALLEY MoKINSEY. 
State of Virg·inia, 
Oi~y of Richmond, to-wit: 
This is to certify that this 24th day of January, 1938, Lula 
Talley McKinsey, whose name is signed to the foregoing 
writing, personally appeared before me, John W. Fussell, a 
Commissioner in ChanMry, and made C?ath that the matters 
therein stated are true to the best of her knowledge and be-
lief. 
JOHN W. FU8SELL, 
Commissioner in Chancery. 
I 
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page 7 } ORDER ENTERED APRIL 12, 1938. 
This day came the defendant, by counsel, and presented 
his demurrer to the bill of complaint which is this day filed 
by leave of Court, and the demurrer is set down for argu-
ment. 
DEMURRE};t. 
Filed under order of April 12, 1938. 
To the Honorable William A. Moncure, Judge of said Court: 
The demurrer of Vernon S. Cullingsworth, individually, 
and as Administrator c. t. a. of the estate of Addie J. Smith, 
deceased, to a bill in equity exhibited against him in the 
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond iby Lula Talley Mc-
Kinsey. This defendant, by counsel, now comes and says that 
the bill is not sufficient in law and for grounds of demurr.er 
states as follows: 
_ 1. That the bill on its face does now show facts sufficient 
for the intervention of a court of equity in this controversy. 
2. That the plain language of the will of Addie J. Smith 
as set forth in the bill of complaint shows that the said tes-
tator left all of her estate in fee simple to this defendant. 
3. That by the plain language of the said will it is clear 
.that the testator did not intend to set up any trust in favor 
of complainant herein and on t11e contrary no such trust can 
l:>e construed from the lang·uag-e of said will. 
' 4. This defendant reserves· the right to set up 
page 8 } additional grounds o-f demurrer as and when he· 
may be adviser 
VERNON S. CULLINGSWORTH 
By R. HUGH RUDD, Counsel. 
· ORDER ENTER.ED JANUARY 6, 1939. 
This day came the c~mplainant, Lula Talley McKinsey, 
by her attorney, and by leave of the Court filed her Amended 
Bill of Complaint a11d the ca.use is remanded to rules to be 
matured as the law provides. 
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AMENDED BILL. 
Filed in Court under order of l anuary 6, 1939. 
To the Honorable William A. Moncure, Judge of the said 
Court: 
.Your complainant, Lula Talley McKinsey, respectfully 
shows unto your Honor as follows: 
That at the First February Rules, 1938, your complainant 
exhibited in this Honorable Court her original Bill of Com-
plaint ag·ainst the respondent, Vernon S. Cullingsworth, 
wherein she set forth that she was the niece of a certain Addie 
J. Smith who departed this life on the 2nd day of September, 
1932; that a paper writing purporting to be the last will and 
testament of the said Addie J. Smith was on the 6th day of 
October, 1932, admitted to probate in this Honorable Court, 
which paper writing is fully set forth in the said original 
Bill of Complaint.; that your complainant is the ''Lula" 
mentioned in the said will; that the said Addie J. 
page 9 ~ Smith left a considerable estate, both real and per-
sonal, the extact nature and extent of which your 
complainant was not advised; and thereupon she prayed that 
the said respondent,. Vernon S. Cullingsworth, individually 
and as administrator c. t. a. of the estate of Addie J. Smith, 
deceased, be made a party respondent to the said original 
Bill of Complaint; that he be required to make full and suf-
ficient answer to the same under oath; that proper process 
issue; that the respondent in his answer ,be required to set 
forth a. true and perfect account of all the property which 
came into his hands, both real and personal, as administrator 
c1im testamento an,nexo under the will of the said Addie .J. 
Smith, deceased, together with an account of the application 
thereof; and that this Honorable Court construe the will of 
the said Addie J. Smith and decree the interest of your com-
plainant therein, and for other supplementary relief; and, 
That during the month of April, 1938, the respondent ap-
peared and demurred to the said original Bill of Complaint; 
that the Court has not yet either sustained or overruled the 
said Demurrer; and that the said respondent has never filed 
any answer to the said allegations contained in the said origi-
nal Bill of Complaint ; and 
That your complainant was the favorite niece of the said 
Addie J. Smith in her lifetime and was repeatedly told by 
her that she, the said Addie tT. Smith, intended to leave all 
I 
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of her property, both real and personal, to your complainant; 
that the same declaration of intention on the part of the said 
Addie J. Smith was made by her to several other members 
of the family and that all of the members of your 
page 10 ~ complainant's family, including the respondent, 
understood the aforesaid intention on the part of 
the said Addie J. Smith to provide for your complainant; 
and that on the I9th day of August, 1932, the said Addie J. 
Smith wrote a letter to your complainant and stated in writ-
ing. her intention to make provision after her death for your 
complainant, which said letter. was in the following words 
and figures, to-wit: 
Lula Grace dear, 
";Fri. Aug! 19, 1932. 
2513 W. Main. 
Hope you are not sick you did not come back. I a.m not 
feeling very well. Had an awful heart attack yesterday. I 
prepared dinner for you. Come as soon as you get a chance. 
I want to talk to you. I feel so sorry for you. just as I told 
you, do not have those children put in no home. I did not 
g·ive your letter you wrote to me about Mr. Lewis interceding 
about your children. .Just like I tell you you hold to your 
little ones, I am very feeble and this old heart will not stand 
much longer. You could have used my back room, you said 
you were afraid the children would annoy me. You are wel-
come to them if you can make out, for when I am gone, you 
can have possession of all that I leave behind, for they all 
have a home but you if anything happens to me and you are 
not here. What clothing· you do not want g·ive to the Old 
Ladies Home. Put my rose bushes in my section, there will 
be room enough for yourself a.nd ·children, so do 
pag·e 11 } not worry so much about your children. Little 
Willie looks verv badlv don't think he is here for 
very long. Have you seei~ Venor since you and I saw him 
pass here on t.he car, they don 't bothe1· to come where I am 
unless he is in trouble and needs something. Have some of 
those door props if you can sell them. Here is a dime you 
pay your way over here and I will give you money to come 
home. How is little Jennie? How does Garnell get-his 
wife T I do not favor nor fancy her very much. You take 
care of Aunt Addie's jewelry until Liza is old enough to wear 
them. You could live here or sell and get you any place. The 
money which is left will help take care of you all for a while. 
I promised Hattie, Harvey's wife the spread you can give 
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it to her. Come and bring your children with you. Are you 
still with the ~ame people! If you manage right you will.· 
have a home the balance of your days. Will look for you 
soon. Give my life love to all, bring your little ones with you 
if you want to. 
from Aunt Addie. 
8/19/32'' 
Wherefore, your complainant prays that the said Vernon 
S. Cullingsworth may be made a party respondent to this 
Amended Bill of !Complaint; that he be required to answer 
both the original Bill of Complaint and this Amended Bill-of 
Complaint under oath; and that your complainant may have 
the relief prayed for in her original Bill of Complaint and 
all such other, further and general relief in the premises as 
the nature of her case may require or to equity 
page 12 ~ shall seem meet. And, as in duty bound your com-
plainant will ever pray, etc. 
LULA TALLEY McKINSEY. 
LEITH S. BREMNER, 
ROBERT LEWIS YOUNG, p. q. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit.: 
This is to certify that this 4th day of January, 1939, Lula 
Talley McKinsey, whose name is signed to the foregoing writ-
ing, personally appeared before me, .John W. Fussell, a Com-
missioner in Chancery for tlie Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond, and made oath that the matters and. things therein 
stated are true to the best of her knowledge and belief. 
JOHN W. FUSSELL, 
Commissioner in Chancery for the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
DEMURRER TO AMENDED BILL. 
Filed in Court under order July 26, 1939. 
To the HonoraJ:>le William A. Moncure, Judge of said Court: 
The demurrer of Vernon S. Cullingsworth, · individually 
~,.·' 
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and as Administrator c. t. a.~of the estate of Addie J. Smith, 
deceased, to the amended ibill of complaint exhibited against 
him in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond . by Lnla 
Talley McKinsey. This defendant, · by counsel, 
page 13 ~ . now comes and says that the amended bill is not 
sufficient in law a.nd for grounds of. demurrer states 
as follows : · · 
1. That the amended bill on its face does not show facts 
sufficient for the· intervention of a court of equity in this 
controversy. 
2. That it appears on the face of complainant's amended 
bill that the matters and things therein sought to be inquired 
of and determined have long since been inquired into and 
determined against the complainant by the probate order en-
tered by this Court on October 6, 1932, whereby the last will 
and testament of the said Addie J. Smith ·was admitted to 
probate. 
3. ·That the additional matter set out in the amended ·bill 
of complaint is immaterial and irrelevant to determination 
of the issues in this suit and that any testimony tha.t might 
be introduced to support this additional matter would be 
and is inadmissible by all the rules of evidence in a matter 
of this kind; and that the purpose of alleging said additional 
matter is to contradict and refute the plain language of the 
will of Addie J. Smith instead of aiding the Court to inter-
pret and construe said will. ' v··_ 
4. Also the reasons set out in tlle demurrer to the original 
bill: 
This defendant reserves the right to set up additional 
grounds of demurrer as and when he may be advised. 
page 14 ~ 
VERNON S. CULLINGSWORTH, 
By R. HUGH R.UDD, Counsel. 
ORDER ENTERED ,JULY 26, 1939. 
This cause came on this day to be again heard upon the 
original and amended bill of complaint heretofore filed by 
the complainant, and to the demurrers thereto filed by the de-
fendant, issue having· been joined on said demurrers and 
same having been set down for argument, and fully a rgned 
bv counsel. · 
~ On consideration whereof the Court being of opinion that 
the demurrer is well taken, it is, therefore adjudged and or-
.... _ \ .. 
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dered that the demurrers to the original and amended bills of 
complaint be, and the same are hereby sustained, and that 
the complainant's bills be dismissed, and that she pay the 
cost of th1~ .proceeding. 
To which action of the Court the complainant excepted. 
I, Charles 0. Saville, Clerk of the Chancery Court of the 
City of Richmond, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record, as ordered by counsel, and that no-
tice in obedience to Section 6339, Code of Virginia, has been 
duly g·iven. 
CH.&S. 0. SAVIILE, Clerk. 
Fee for transcript of record: $5.60. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. W ATTiS, C. C. · 
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